VIA: _____ (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EGMA-32784
200-124-39
MB File 559

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, IO
Attn: [redacted]

DATE: 11 March 1958

FROM : Chief, Munich Base [redacted]

INFO: Chief, EE
COS, Germany

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/DTDORIC/QKACTIVE

SPECIFIC— Transmittal of Letter by [redacted] on Security of QKACTIVE Communications Channel.

ACTION REQUIRED: For your information and consideration.

Under date of 5 March 1958 [redacted] addressed a letter to PBAFFIRM in which he raised a question about the security of QKACTIVE telex traffic, which he declares must be assumed to be fully covered by unfriendly monitoring services since the telex circuit runs from Munich via cable through the Soviet Zone of Germany to Berlin where the radio transmitters are located. While it is quite unlikely that this circumstance has never been brought to Headquarters attention: nevertheless, it appears important enough to pass on at this time with [redacted] observations.

[redacted]

Approved: [redacted] /os

Attachment: As stated

Distribution:
3 - IO w/Att in dupl USC
2 - EE w/1 copy Att USC
2 - COS/G w/1 copy Att USC

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200-124-39/3

SECRET

March 5, 1958

AMCONFIDENTIAL

Mrs. Geraldine DeMuro
American Committee for Liberation
1657 Broadway
New York 19, New York

Dear Mrs. DeMuro,

Routine examination of the material currently being transmitted between Munich and New York via telex indicates that a review of our communications system may be in order.

As far as I have been able to determine, the telex circuit runs from Munich via cable through the Soviet zone of Germany to Berlin where the radio transmitters are located. There is, thus, no necessity for even a wire tap, since all that is needed to monitor the circuit is teletype receiving equipment set up near the transmitter site. The problem of receiving transmissions from New York is more difficult, but quite possible.

In any case, we must operate under the assumption that our telex traffic is being fully covered by unfriendly monitoring services, and when deciding whether or not material should be telexed, the need for rapidity of communication must be weighed against the consideration of the extent to which the knowledge of the material might be of benefit to the Soviets and/or detrimental to the American Committee's operations.

The following are a few of the instances I have noticed which appear to involve a security violation:

PXC 13 of February 27, 1958 which links this office with activity which would not normally be within our province;

PXC 5 of February 24, 1958 which hints at behind the secenes direction or sponsorship of the Institute;

Telegrams 4562/53 newyork 5026 73/67 11 1708 and 2025 newyork 5011 551/543 11 1729, and PXC 2 of February 6, 1958, which contain American Committee budget breakdowns which could be of considerable interest to the other side;

MUN 4 of January 31 and PXC 12 of February 4, 1958 which discuss the proposed anti-colonial conference. Advance notice of this sort of thing could be of great interest to unfriendly intelligence organizations.

I have been discussing this problem with the staff here and feel that I have been able to clear up some of these things on this end. Please talk this problem over with the people there in New York using these examples and any others that might come to your attention to see if we can not tighten up our

security here. I realize that in some matters requiring quick attention, time can be of a greater importance than security but it would appear that in some cases the convenience of using the telex is the deciding factor. In any case, I have not included certain messages where I have felt that time was the vital factor.

Sincerely yours,

[redacted]

GLB/mlt